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An Empirical Comparison of Human
Value Models
Paul H. P. Hanel*†, Lukas F. Litzellachner† and Gregory R. Maio
Department of Psychology, University of Bath, Bath, United Kingdom
Over the past century, various value models have been proposed. To determine which
value model best predicts prosocial behavior, mental health, and pro-environmental
behavior, we subjected seven value models to a hierarchical regression analysis.
A sample of University students (N = 271) completed the Portrait Value Questionnaire
(Schwartz et al., 2012), the Basic Value Survey (Gouveia et al., 2008), and the Social
Value Orientation scale (Van Lange et al., 1997). Additionally, they completed the
Values Survey Module (Hofstede and Minkov, 2013), Inglehart’s (1977) materialism–
postmaterialism items, the Study of Values, fourth edition (Allport et al., 1960; Kopelman
et al., 2003), and the Rokeach (1973) Value Survey. However, because the reliability of
the latter measures was low, only the PVQ-RR, the BVS, and the SVO where entered into
our analysis. Our results provide empirical evidence that the PVQ-RR is the strongest
predictor of all three outcome variables, explaining variance above and beyond the other
two instruments in almost all cases. The BVS significantly predicted prosocial and pro-
environmental behavior, while the SVO only explained variance in pro-environmental
behavior.
Keywords: human values, altruistic behavior, general health behavior, pro-environmental behavior, cultural values
INTRODUCTION
Over the past century, many models of human values have been proposed and empirically
supported. While all developers of new value models have explained the theoretical advantages
of their approach, they have not tested whether their value model has a higher predictive validity
than any of the previous value models. In the present research, we aim to address this gap by
directly comparing whether more recent value models are better in explaining a range of behaviors
than their predecessors and whether they predict behaviors differently. We first give a very brief
history of models of values, before turning to our selection of value models for comparison and
summarizing the scarce literature comparing value models (Rokeach, 1973; Spates, 1983; Rohan,
2000; Hitlin and Piliavin, 2004; Gouveia, 2013; Maio, 2016).
History of Human Values
Human values are often defined as abstract ideals that guide people’s behavior (Schwartz, 1992;
Maio, 2010; Fischer, 2017). Here, we describe value models that have been cited frequently
in the literature and build at least partly on each other: Spranger’s (1921) model of types of
people as operationalized by Vernon and Allport (1931) and Allport et al. (1960), Rokeach’s
(1973) instrumental and terminal values, Schwartz’s (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al., 2012) quasi-
circumplex-model of human values, and Gouveia’s (2013) functional theory of values. Further, we
included two prominent cultural value models: Inglehart’s (1977) materialism–postmaterialism
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values and Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) cultural value dimensions.
Additionally, we measured social value orientations (SVOs; Van
Lange et al., 1997). We first describe models that measure values
on an individual basis, before turning to cultural value models.
Individual Value Models
Early in the 20th century, Münsterberg (1908) provided
the first formal psychological model of values. His model
maps values onto a four-by-two framework. This framework
contrasts life values with cultural values on one dimension and
logical, aesthetic, ethical, and metaphysical values, on the other
dimension. In each of the eight cells, there is one ‘value type’
and three values, which are further differentiated according to
whether they relate to the external, social, and internal world.
The value types are existence, unity, developmental, and god
values (life value types), and coherence, beauty, achievement, and
basic values (cultural value types). Münsterberg’s model appears
to be somewhat similar to Gouveia’s functional theory, which we
describe below (Gouveia, 2013; Gouveia et al., 2014a), although
the names of the value types and values differ. However, to the
best of our knowledge, there is no measure of values based on
Münsterberg’s model (see Figure 1 for a timeline of the here
discussed value models).
Another important theoretical contribution was made by
Eduard Spranger. In his book, Types of Men, Spranger (1921)
differentiated between the theoretical, economic, aesthetic, social,
political, and religious person. Spranger proposed that one of six
value orientations is predominant in each person. The theoretical
person, for example, strives for knowledge and truth, whereas
the economic person strives for usefulness. Spranger influenced
Vernon and Allport (1931) and Allport et al. (1960), who created
a survey to measure the six types of values. In this survey,
participants would first indicate their preference on a number of
controversial statements before ranking other statements related
to the six types.
However, Rokeach (1973) criticized Allport et al.’s (1960)
measure of values as measuring attitudes, rather than idealized
standards with an “ought” character (Maio, 2010). Instead,
Rokeach proposed to measure values with 36 items such as
“Equality (brotherhood, equal opportunity for all)” or “Obedient
(dutiful, respectful),” which should be ranked based on their
importance as guiding principles in one’s life. Using this
approach, Rokeach obtained abundant evidence for links between
the importance of values and diverse attitudes and behavior (e.g.,
Rokeach, 1971, 1973).
Rokeach’s (1973) model was highly influential, but it lacked
a method for making predictions about connections between
different values and other attitudes and behavior. Schwartz
and Bilsky (1987, 1990) built on Rokeach’s conceptualization
of values, but introduced a theoretical perspective examining
motivational differences between values. These researchers found
that Rokeach’s 36 values could be ordered into seven or eight
value types based on their motivational dynamics and that these
value types, in turn, can be organized into a two-dimensional
circumplex. Building on these findings and a new theoretical
perspective, Schwartz (1992) postulated the existence of 11
value types and assessed these in the Schwartz Value Survey.
FIGURE 1 | Historical overview of selected important contributions to human
value research.
The 11 value types are self-direction, stimulation, hedonism,
achievement, power, security, tradition, conformity, spirituality,
benevolence, and universalism. Based on analyses conducted by
Roccas and Sagiv, Schwartz (1992) found across 20 countries
and 40 samples (mostly students and teachers) that 10 value
types could be reliably differentiated in most samples. Each
value type consists of two to nine values and can be ordered
along two dimensions: openness versus conservation and self-
transcendence versus self-enhancement. Spirituality did not
emerge as an independent value type. During the last 25 years,
in samples from more than 80 countries, Schwartz et al. (2001,
2012) and Bilsky et al. (2011) have found support for his proposed
structure of human values.
Schwartz et al. (2012) published a revised version of his
theory, postulating 19 rather than 10 value types. Most of
the 10 value types were divided into two. For example, the
value type self-direction was divided into self-direction-thoughts
and self-direction-actions (see Table 1 for the 19 value types
and conceptual definitions). In his refined theory, Schwartz
introduces a contrast between values with a personal focus
(openness and self-enhancement) and those with a social focus
(conservation and self-transcendence), thereby incorporating
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TABLE 1 | Values and definitions in Schwartz’s revised model of values.
Value Conceptual definitions in terms of
motivational goals
Self-Direction–Thought Freedom to cultivate one’s own ideas and
abilities
Self-Direction–Action Freedom to determine one’s own actions
Stimulation Excitement, novelty, and change
Hedonism Pleasure and sensuous gratification
Achievement Success according to social standards
Power–Dominance Power through exercising control over
people
Power–Resources Power through control of material and
social resources
Face Security and power through maintaining
one’s public image and avoiding humiliation
Security–Personal Safety in one’s immediate environment
Security–Societal Safety and stability in the wider society
Tradition Maintaining and preserving cultural, family,
or religious traditions
Conformity–Rules Compliance with rules, laws, and formal
obligations
Conformity–Interpersonal Avoidance of upsetting or harming other
people
Humility Recognizing one’s insignificance in the
larger scheme of things
Benevolence–Dependability Being a reliable and trustworthy member of
the ingroup
Benevolence–Caring Devotion to the welfare of ingroup members
Universalism–Concern Commitment to equality, justice, and
protection for all people
Universalism–Nature Preservation of the natural environment
Universalism–Tolerance Acceptance and understanding of those
who are different from oneself
Adapted from Schwartz et al. (2012).
a contrast proposed 60 years earlier (Parsons et al., 1951).
It is worth noting that this model’s new sub-divisions of the
motivational value types (Gouveia et al., 2014a) can be justified
by arguing that the values form a motivational continuum. Just
as the color spectrum can be divided into very few or very
many categories, so too can the array of values (Schwartz, 2014).
Schwartz’s theory has been validated with a range of measures
(Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al., 2001, 2012; Lee et al., 2008; for
an overview, see Roccas et al., 2017) and methods (Schwartz,
1992; Schwartz and Boehnke, 2004; Coelho et al., 2018). Further,
picture-based value surveys for children found that the proposed
structure replicated even among children as young as 5-years
(Döring et al., 2010; Collins et al., 2017; Lee et al., 2017).
The most recent value theory is Gouveia’s functional theory
of human values (Gouveia, 2013; Gouveia et al., 2014a), which
has been developed and tested during the last 15 years.
It builds on Maslow’s (1943) theory and is based on two
functions of values, whether values express needs (survival vs.
thriving needs) or guide actions (personal vs. central vs. social
goals), mapped in a two-by-three framework (Table 2). The
functional theory was challenged by Schwartz (2014) as not being
distinct from his own value theory (Schwartz, 1992). Indeed,
several findings that are based on the functional theory (e.g.,
Fischer et al., 2011; Gouveia et al., 2015) could also have been
obtained using Schwartz’s theory. Nevertheless, the functional
theory includes fewer value types, while covering dimensions
similar to those in Schwartz’s model (Gouveia et al., 2014a,b).
The structure of the functional theory was also replicated among
children (Gouveia et al., 2011).
Most of the above described value models build theoretically
on each other, while a separate line of research has proceeded
independently. This line of research investigated SVOs, which are
“defined as stable preferences for certain patterns of outcomes
for oneself and others” (Van Lange et al., 1997). Building
on earlier research on motivations in mixed motive games
(McClintock and Liebrand, 1988), Van Lange et al. (1997)
distinguished between competitive, individualistic, and prosocial
value orientations, which are usually measured by a point-
allocation task in which participants need to allocate points to
themselves and another person. Competitive individuals seek to
maximize their own outcomes relative to the outcomes of the
other person. Individualistic individuals seek to maximize their
own outcomes, irrespective of the outcomes for the other person.
Finally, prosocial individuals seek to strive for equality, while
trying to maximize the outcomes for themselves and the other
person. There are correlations between these classifications and
scores on Schwartz’s measures of values (Joireman and Duell,
2005), but no comparison of the predictive power of these models
to our knowledge.
Cultural Value Models
The value theories described so far have focused on values at the
individual level. However, as Kluckhohn (1951) noted, values can
also be described on a cultural level. Three prominent approaches
of this type were proposed by Inglehart (1977), Hofstede
(1980), Hofstede (2001), and Schwartz (1999, 2006). Inglehart
reduced Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy of needs to materialism and
postmaterialism, which are at opposite ends of a unidimensional
continuum (for discussions about the unidimensionality, see
Saccbi, 1998; Dobewall and Rudnev, 2014). Materialism is linked
with physical and material security, whereas postmaterialism is
linked with freedom and self-expression. Inglehart was especially
interested in whether and how values shift across time in relation
to cultural change. For example, he found that economic growth
is accompanied by a shift in values from materialism to post-
materialism (Inglehart and Baker, 2000). In other words, societies
become more tolerant, rational, and focus less on absolute
norms when they economically develop. Importantly, Inglehart’s
measure of materialism and postmaterialism values can also be
assessed on an individual level to test for individual differences,
rather than country or cultural differences.
Hofstede links values and culture in his work on cultural
dimensions. His understanding of values is based on the
research of Kluckhohn (1951) and Rokeach (1973). His definition
of culture, “the collective programming of the mind that
distinguishes the members of one group or category of people
from another” (Hofstede, 2001), points directly to the aim of
his empirical work: to find elements that reliably differentiate
cultures. Based on work he conducted for a computing
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TABLE 2 | The functional theory of human values.
Values as guides of actions (circle of goals)
Personal goals Central goals Social goals
Values as expressions of needs
(level of needs)
Thriving needs Excitement values Suprapersonal values Interactive values
Emotion Beauty Affection
Pleasure Knowledge Belonging
Sexuality Maturity Support
Survival needs Promotion values Existence values Normative values
Power Health Obedience
Prestige Stability Religiosity
Success Survival Tradition
Adapted from Gouveia et al. (2014a).
corporation, IBM, Hofstede (1980) identified four cultural
dimensions, which he later extended to six dimensions: Power–
distance, individualism vs. collectivism, uncertainty avoidance,
masculinity vs. femininity, long-term orientation, and indulgence
vs. restraints (Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede et al., 2010). Importantly,
Hofstede argued that the cultural dimensions can only be found
on a country but not on an individual level (cf. Fischer et al.,
2010). However, others found that Hofstede’s values can be
measured on an individual level and developed a suitable scale
for this (Yoo et al., 2011).
Hofstede’s perspective has been highly influential in cross-
cultural research, but Schwartz’s (2006) theory of cultural
value orientations (CVOs) has recently emerged as a useful
alternate view. Schwartz’s CVO model is derived from his prior
theory of individual human values (Schwartz, 1992), which was
described above. In other words, the CVOs consists of the
same values as the original individual-level model containing
10 value types (Schwartz, 1992), but grouped together in a
way that better reflect cultural idiosyncrasies. Schwartz (2006)
posits seven a priori CVOs, which are thought to “express
shared conceptions of what is good and desirable in the culture,
the cultural ideals” (Schwartz, 2006). In his approach, cultural
values are usually measured by aggregating value scores from
individual responses to measures of values in a culture. The seven
CVOs are intellectual autonomy (being independent), affective
autonomy (pursuing positive affective experiences), mastery
(encouraging self-assertion), hierarchy (unequal distribution of
power), embeddedness (being part of a collective), harmony
(fitting harmoniously into the environment), and egalitarianism
(being concerned for others).
Comparisons of Value Models
The above described value models show a range of similarities
and differences (for more extensive comparisons of at least
two value models, see Schwartz, 2006; Datler et al., 2013). To
help compare the models in brief, it is useful to use Schwartz’s
model as reference point because of its high contemporary
influence. One of the most salient differences between Schwartz’s
refined value model (Schwartz et al., 2012) and the other value
models is the number of proposed values. For example, whereas
Inglehart’s (1977) value model consists of only two values,
Schwartz’s refined theory (Schwartz et al., 2012) consists of
19 value types. The materialism–postmaterialism dimension of
Inglehart is highly correlated with Schwartz’s embeddedness-
autonomy (or security/tradition- self-direction) and Hofstede’s
collectivism–individualism dimension (Inglehart and Oyserman,
2004; Dobewall and Strack, 2014). However, the materialism–
postmaterialism dimension of Inglehart misses out on a range of
other important values that can be found in other value models,
such as benevolence or power values (Dobewall and Rudnev,
2014) or interactive and promotion values (in Gouveia’s model).
Similarly, the SVOs (Van Lange et al., 1997) do not capture values
related to security or tradition. The values of Gouveia’s (2003)
model do, as discussed above, tap into motivational dimensions
very similar to those expressed by Schwartz’s values (Gouveia
et al., 2014b; Schwartz, 2014), although they do not capture
explicitly self-direction values. For example, Gouveia’s excitement
values are very similar to Schwartz’s stimulation and hedonism
values, promotion is very similar to achievement and power,
existence is very similar to security, and normative to tradition
and conformity (see Lima, 2012, for empirical support). Lima
(2012) found slightly stronger correlations between behavior
intentions and self-reported behaviors with the values of the
functional theory than with Schwartz’s values. Also, Rokeach
values are very similar to Schwartz’s (1992) values, as Schwartz
used the 36 values proposed by Rokeach as a basis of his model.
However, Rokeach’s values do not reflect an a priori theoretical
distinction between values expressing different motives, and
there is no empirical basis for confirming its comprehensiveness.
(It can be argued that the capture of the circular space by
Schwartz’s model shows comprehensiveness, at least for two
value dimensions.) In contrast, Spranger’s (1921) types of values
are more distinct. While the economic, political, religious, and
social values overlap partly with achievement, power, tradition,
and benevolence values, the aesthetic and theoretical values are
more conceptually distinct from Schwartz’s values (which do not
explicitly separate artistic and intellectual orientations).
Although these conceptual comparisons align with past
descriptions of the value models, empirical data comparing the
models is sparse. Surprisingly, only a few studies have compared
value models directly, and researchers have rarely compared
more than two value models. A direct comparison between
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Schwartz’s (1992) original 10 value type model and Inglehart’s
model (Inglehart and Baker, 2000) revealed that Inglehart’s value
measure had lower internal consistency and construct validity,
but it was more consistent in predicting a range of dependent
variables such as openness to immigration, church attendance,
or life satisfaction than Schwartz’s value measure (Datler et al.,
2013). On a cultural level, Schwartz’s CVOs were related to
international trade, whereas Hofstede’s cultural dimensions were
not (Ng et al., 2007). In contrast, Schwartz’s CVOs were related
to various dimensions of peacefulness approximately as strongly
as were Hofstede’s and Inglehart’s values (Basabe and Valencia,
2007). There is a lack of comparisons across a range of models
in the same studies. This omission is significant, particularly
given the importance of values in research on diverse topics
(e.g., environment, health, prejudice, social conflict). It would
be useful to empirically determine how the models compare.
In particular, do any of the models fare better in predicting
important behaviors? Do some of the values described in other
models fall into space neglected by Schwartz’s value model, which
is arguably the most comprehensive thus far?
The Present Research
In the present research, we tested which out of the seven
previously described value models would be best in predicting
three important behaviors on an individual level. Also, we tested
whether more recent models explain variance above and beyond
older models. We chose the values operationalized by Vernon
and Allport (1931) and Allport et al. (1960), Rokeach (1973),
Gouveia (2013), and Schwartz’s refined value model (Schwartz
et al., 2012), because each of these models explicitly builds
on earlier models. Additionally, we added Inglehart’s (1977)
materialism–postmaterialism values and Hofstede’s (1984, 2001)
cultural dimensions because of their prominence in cross-
cultural research, including marketing research (e.g., Wong,
2004), political sciences and sociology (Inglehart and Baker,
2000). As a seventh value measure, we included the Social
Value Orientations scale (Van Lange et al., 1997). Although it
is somewhat distinct from the other six value measures (both in
conceptualizations and measurement), we included the measure
to test whether the SVOs explain variance in prosocial behavior,
one of the three selected dependent variables, above and beyond
the other six value measures (see rationale below).
We acknowledge that there have been several other studies
that have compared other value measures, which we have not
included in our survey. Examples are the List of Values and
various work value measures (Beatty et al., 1985; Ravlin and
Meglino, 1987; Oishi et al., 1998). They were not included because
our survey was already long. We were worried that adding
additional scales would have decreased the reliabilities of the
measures because of fatigue.
As dependent variables, we selected prosocial, environmental,
and mental health behaviors because of their relevance in
contemporary research. Also, all of those behaviors were found to
be related to values in past research (Kristiansen, 1985; Bond and
Chi, 1997; Schultz and Zelezny, 1998; de Miranda Coelho et al.,
2006; Sagiv et al., 2011; Bilican et al., 2016; Hanel and Wolfradt,
2016; Bouman et al., 2018). Based on this previous research
and theoretical considerations, we predicted that prosocial value
orientations (Van Lange et al., 1997) would be the strongest
predictor of prosocial behavior, because the point allocation task
used to measure SVOs is a kind of prosocial behavior in itself.
Furthermore, we assumed that identifying oneself with the social
value type (Spranger, 1921; Allport et al., 1960), and placing
higher importance on benevolence values (Schwartz et al., 2012)
and interactive values (Gouveia, 2013) are also associated with
prosocial behavior. In addition, although we postulated that
Schwartz et al.’s (2012) universalism–nature value type would
be the strongest predictor of environmental behavior because of
its underlying motivation to preserve the natural environment,
we expected that long-term orientation (Hofstede et al., 2010)
would also be related to pro-environmental behavior because
environmental pollution has mostly long-term consequences.
Finally, we predicted that security-personal values (Schwartz
et al., 2012) and existence values (Gouveia, 2013) are the strongest
predictors of health related behavior, because both reflect the
importance that individuals place on personal safety and health.
In a final step, we tested whether we could replicate Lima’s
(2012) findings that there are meaningful correlations between
Gouveia’s and Schwartz’s values (see above) and subjected all
value types into a single multidimensional space analysis.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Respondents
Our sample consisted of 271 psychology undergraduate students
from Cardiff University who responded to an online survey in
exchange for course credits. For the hierarchical regressions, 35
respondents were excluded due to missing data (it is not possible
to have different sample sizes in hierarchical regression analysis
across variables). Of these participants, 22 were excluded due
to having an ambiguous SVO (they did not choose any specific
option more than six times), the other 13 due to missing data
in the outcome variables leaving 236 (212 women; Mage = 20.35
years, SD = 9.38) respondents within the hierarchical regression
analyses. The study was approved by the ethics committee of the
School of Psychology, Cardiff University.
Procedure and Measurements
The survey was constructed and presented online. After receiving
information about the survey’s aims and giving consent,
respondents were asked to answer different scales assessing
their values. Additionally, the survey contained instruments
measuring prosocial behavior, mental health, and environmental
behavior. The questionnaires and their items were presented in a
randomized order. Respondents were debriefed upon completion
of the survey.
Value Instruments
To measure the 19 values of the revised Schwartz model, we used
the revised Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ-RR, Schwartz
et al., 2012). This instrument asks respondents to read 57
statements about a fictitious person of the same gender as them.
The statements convey information about what the other person
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considers to be important in life, such as “It is important to her
to care for nature” (universalism–nature). For each individual
statement, respondents are asked to indicate how similar they
are to that other person. The response scale ranged from 1
(not at all like me) to 6 (very much like me). The items were
averaged to represent 19 value types (Schwartz et al., 2012),
which had reliabilities between α = 0.59 (humility) and α = 0.87
(universalism–nature).
The values of the functional theory were measured with
the Basic Value Survey (Gouveia, 2003; Gouveia et al., 2008).
Respondents rated the importance of each of 18 values (e.g.,
social support, religiosity, belonging) using a scale ranging from
1 (completely unimportant) to 7 (of the utmost importance). The
six resulting value types were adequately reliable, with αs ranging
from 0.56 (suprapersonal) to 0.69 (interactive).
Social value orientations were assessed using the 9-item
measure (Van Lange et al., 1997). The measures asked
participants to choose among three options in which they
simultaneously assign points to themselves and to another,
unknown person. Every item presented an option to either
maximize their own outcome (individual value orientation),
maximize the point difference between themselves and the other
(competitive), or split the points evenly between both players
(prosocial). Choosing one of these options at least six out of
nine times assigns a respondent to an individualistic (N = 41),
a competitive (N = 7), or a prosocial value orientation (N = 177),
respectively. In line with previous literature (Joireman et al., 2004;
Joireman and Duell, 2005), we grouped seven respondents with
a competitive SVO together with the individualists to form a
pro-self group. To be able to compare pro-selfs to prosocials in
subsequent analyses, we utilized dummy coding.
Other value measurements included in the survey where
the Values Survey Module (Hofstede and Minkov, 2013), the
Rokeach (1973) Value Survey, the Studies of Values (Kopelman
et al., 2003) which is an updated version of Allport et al.’s (1960)
measure of Spranger’s (1921) value types, and the Materialism–
Postmaterialism Scale (Inglehart and Flanagan, 1987). However,
due to low reliabilities (Values Survey Module: maximum
α = 0.29; SOV: maximum α = 0.26; Materialism Scale: average
correlation between the two parts: r = 0.36), or multicollinearity
issues (RVS), we dismissed them from all further analyses. Thus,
we only focused on the PVQ-RR, the BVS, and the SVO-task in
the analysis.
Behavior Scales
Prosocial behavior was assessed with the self-reported Altruism
Scale (Rushton et al., 1981). Respondents read 20 statements
about past pro-social behavior (e.g., “I have given money to a
charity,” “I have given a stranger a lift in my car”). To indicate
how frequently they carried out these acts, respondents used a 5-
point Likert-scale ranging from “Never” to “Very often.” Their
score was then created by averaging all items (α = 0.84).
Respondents’ health was assessed by the 12 question short-
form of the General Health Questionnaire (Goldberg and
Williams, 1988). It asks the respondents about their mental well-
being over the last few weeks (e.g., “have you recently lost much
sleep over worry?”, “have you recently felt you couldn’t overcome
your difficulties?”). These questions were answered on a 4-point
Likert-scale. The answer options were always phrased so that
high scores indicate low mental well-being (α = 0.89). Because
the content of the questions revolves around mental rather than
general health, we will henceforth refer to the construct measured
by this scale as mental health.
Pro-environmental behavior was measured with 12 items that
were used in previous studies (Whitmarsh and O’Neill, 2010;
Evans et al., 2014). Participants indicated how often they behaved
in an environmentally friendly manner (e.g., “turned off lights
you’re not using,” “Walk, cycle or used public transportation for
short journeys of less than 5 km”). Responses were given on a
5-point scale ranging from “Never” to “Very often.” Alternatively,
respondents could indicate that this activity does not apply to
them. The overall score was computed by summing across all
items and dividing by the number of items that applied to the
participant (α = 0.69).
Statistical Analysis
We used the R software environment (R Development Core
Team, 2017) for statistical computing. The analysis script can
be found alongside the data1. We conducted 18 hierarchical
regressions (six per outcome) to investigate our hypotheses
regarding each behavior. We determined whether a newly added
value measure significantly predicts variance left unexplained by
the previously included value measures by comparing the amount
of variance explained, adjusted for the number of predictors
within the analysis (adjusted R2), before and after a measure was
added to the analysis. We used the adjusted R2 to account for the
measures each consisting of an unequal number of predictors. To
investigate the relations among the value measures themselves,
we subjected the BVS and the PVQ-RR to a Multidimensional
Scaling (MDS) Analysis.
RESULTS
Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations for all outcome
measures per SVO. Contrary to previous research (Joireman
et al., 2004), t-tests revealed a significant differences in pro-
environmental behavior between respondents with a prosocial
SVO (M = 3.35) and respondents with an pro-self SVO
(M = 3.09), t(61.58) = 2.27, p = 0.027, r = 0.21. Other differences
between the SVO groups were negligible.
Table 4 shows the correlations among all value types
from the three instruments remaining the analysis. As in
1https://osf.io/jd6ze/
TABLE 3 | Means and standard deviations of all outcome variables for both social
value orientations.
Value orientation Pro-social behavior Mental health Environmentalism
Prosocial (N = 189) 2.70 (0.50) 1.31 (0.49) 3.35 (0.59)
Pro-Self (N = 47) 2.68 (0.62) 1.30 (0.50) 3.09 (0.73)
Numbers in brackets represent the standard deviation.
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TABLE 4 | Correlations of all value measures within the analysis.
PVQ-RR BVS SVO Prosocial
Interactive Normative Suprapersonal Existence Excitement Promotion
Self-Direction–Thought 0.12 −0.15 0.32 0.29 0.26 0.17 0.07
Self-Direction–Action 0.16 −0.02 0.33 0.27 0.29 0.23 0.10
Stimulation 0.14 0.04 0.30 0.20 0.47 0.25 0.04
Hedonism 0.38 −0.05 0.25 0.29 0.56 0.19 −0.06
Achievement 0.44 0.11 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.54 −0.17
Power–Dominance 0.02 0.21 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.59 −0.10
Power–Resources 0.02 0.13 0.07 0.06 0.15 0.54 −0.17
Face 0.28 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.10 0.37 −0.14
Security–Personal 0.41 0.30 0.16 0.47 0.08 0.24 −0.14
Security–Societal 0.31 0.29 0.21 0.29 0.26 0.23 −0.07
Tradition 0.10 0.71 0.03 0.15 −0.01 0.20 −0.03
Conformity–Rule 0.22 0.47 0.05 0.26 −0.12 0.14 −0.04
Conformity–Interpersonal 0.29 0.33 0.17 0.22 −0.02 0.05 −0.03
Humility 0.28 0.25 0.17 0.25 0.05 0.02 0.14
Universalism–Nature 0.06 0.05 0.29 0.14 0.13 0.04 0.10
Universalism–Concern 0.31 0.04 0.36 0.24 0.13 0.00 0.24
Universalism–Tolerance 0.30 0.11 0.30 0.27 0.10 0.01 0.21
Benevolence–Care 0.42 0.20 0.15 0.33 0.12 0.04 0.06
Benevolence–Dependence 0.37 0.20 0.24 0.32 0.21 0.26 −0.02
SVO–Prosocial −0.10 −0.07 −0.02 −0.08 −0.09 −0.17 1
Correlations with the SVO are biserial correlations. Positive scores indicate a positive relationship with a prosocial SVO. All correlations >0.13 are significant at p < 0.05,
correlations >0.17 at p < 0.01, correlations >0.22 at p < 0.001.
previous literature (e.g., Lima, 2012), we observed strong
associations between normative BVS values and the PVQ-RR
values of conformity and tradition, with tradition showing
an exceptionally large correlation of r = 0.71. Furthermore,
the BVS value existence was most strongly related to the
PVQ-RR value security, and the BVS value excitement was
associated with the PVQ-RR values stimulation and hedonism.
The BVS value promotion and the PVQ-RR values of Power
and Achievement were also highly correlated. Less straight
forward was the relationship between the BVS value interactive
and the PVQ-RR values. The BVS interactive value was highly
correlated with security and most self-transcendent values.
Finally, suprapersonal BVS values were mostly related to PVQ-
RR values that represented openness (such as self-direction –
action) or self-transcendence (such as universalism – concern).
Interestingly, only the BVS value promotion was negatively
related to the SVO, while several self-enhancement or self-
transcendence PVQ-RR values were significantly associated with
the SVO.
Table 5 shows the correlations between the value types and
the outcome variables. Both value instruments showed small-
to-medium size correlations with pro-social behavior. For the
PVQ-RR, the highest correlation was found for universalism–
nature, r = 0.29; for the BVS, the highest correlation was for
suprapersonal values, r = 0.23. There were only a few small
correlations with mental health: the strongest correlations
for the PVQ-RR occurred for face, r = 0.27, conformity,
r = 0.15 and hedonism, r = 0.16; for the BVS, only significant
correlation was with suprapersonal values, r = 0.16. There were
small-to-large correlations with pro-environmental behavior.
The highest correlations for the PVQ-RR were with
universalism–nature, r = 0.48, and the highest correlations
for the BVS were with suprapersonal values, r = 0.26. In any case,
the correlations of the PVQ-RR for all three outcome variables
tended to be larger than those of the BVS.
To test which value measure explains the biggest portion
of variance in each individual outcome variable, we conducted
18 regressions (six per outcome). For every outcome variable,
we entered all the values from each measure in the first step
of three separate regressions (e.g., all PVQ-RR values in one
step), followed by entry in the second step of the remaining two
measures in one order (e.g., the BVS and then SVO). We then
repeated the three regressions using the alternate order of the
remaining measures in the second step (e.g., the SVO and then
the BVS).
Hierarchical Regressions – Prosocial
Behavior
When entered first, the PVQ-RR and the BVS explained 14%
(adjusted R2 = 0.14, p < 0.001) and 6% (adjusted R2 = 0.06,
p = 0.001) of the observed variance in prosocial behavior,
respectively. The SVO did not explain a significant amount of
variance on its own (adjusted R2 < 0.01, p = 0.75).
Entering any other values on top of the PVQ-RR did not
significantly increase the proportion of variance explained (BVS:
adjusted R2 = 0.15, p = 0.27 [amount of explained variance by
BVS + PVQ-RR; p-value refers to R2 change]; SVO: adjusted
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TABLE 5 | Correlations of all PVQ-RR and BVS values with all outcome variables.
Value Pro-social
behavior
Mental
health
Environmentalism
PVQ
Self-direction–Thought 0.12 −0.07 0.15
Self-direction–Action 0.17 −0.07 0.16
Stimulation 0.13 −0.01 0.13
Hedonism −0.02 −0.16 0.01
Achievement 0.08 −0.02 0.00
Power–Dominance 0.16 0.06 0.03
Power–Resources 0.01 0.04 −0.03
Face 0.09 0.27 0.10
Security–Personal −0.01 −0.09 0.01
Security–Societal 0.15 0.00 0.08
Tradition 0.23 −0.03 0.05
Conformity–Rule 0.11 −0.01 0.08
Conformity–Interpersonal 0.05 0.15 0.16
Humility 0.21 −0.06 0.15
Universalism–Nature 0.29 0.09 0.48
Universalism–Concern 0.20 0.08 0.22
Universalism–Tolerance 0.21 0.06 0.22
Benevolence–Care 0.17 −0.04 0.11
Benevolence–Dependence 0.20 0.00 0.07
SVO–Prosocial 0.02 0.01 0.17
BVS
Interactive 0.06 −0.07 0.01
Normative 0.17 −0.04 0.06
Suprapersonal 0.23 0.16 0.26
Existence 0.13 −0.08 0.07
Excitement 0.07 −0.05 −0.01
Promotion 0.15 −0.00 0.02
Correlations with the SVO are biserial correlations. Positive scores indicate a
positive relationship with a prosocial SVO. All correlations >0.13 are significant
at p < 0.05, correlations >0.17 at p < 0.01, correlations >0.22 at p < 0.001.
R2 = 0.14, p = 0.37). Entering the BVS in the first step and
the PVQ-RR in the second step lead to a significant increase
in explained variance (adjusted R2 = 0.15, p = 0.005). Similarly,
entering the PVQ in the second step explained variance beyond
the SVO (adjusted R2 = 0.14, p < 0.001). Entering the BVS in
the second step after the SVO increased the amount of variance
explained by 6% (adjusted R2 = 0.06, p < 0.001).
The PVQ-RR still explained additional variance after both BVS
and SVO were entered (adjusted R2 = 0.15, p = 0.004). Entering
the SVO after both PVQ-RR and BVS did not led to a significant
increase in explained variance (adjusted R2 = 0.15, p = 0.41), and
neither did entering the BVS in the last step (adjusted R2 = 0.15,
p = 0.28). Overall, the 19 basic values of the PVQ-RR were the
best predictors of prosocial behavior.
Hierarchical Regressions – Mental Health
The PVQ-RR was a significant predictor of variance in mental
health (adjusted R2 = 0.16, p< 0.001). While SVO did not explain
a significant amount of variance on its own (adjusted R2 < 0.01,
p = 0.91), the BVS missed the conventional level of significance
only by a small margin (adjusted R2 = 0.03, p = 0.055). As neither
of the other two measures where reliable predictors of mental
health, we focus on the PVQ-RR for this part of the analysis.
Entering the PVQ-RR on top of the BVS still resulted in
an increase of roughly 14% in explained variance (adjusted
R2 = 0.17, p < 0.001). The same holds when entering it after
the SVO (adjusted R2 = 0.16, p < 0.001), where it explains an
additional 13% of variance. When entered last, the PVQ-RR still
explains additional 14% variance on top of both BVS and SVO
(adjusted R2 = 0.17, p < 0.001). No other value instruments
significantly explained more variance when entered in the last
step (BVS: adjusted R2 = 0.17, p = 0.19; SVO: Adjusted R2 = 0.17,
p = 0.72). Overall, the Schwartz values were the best predictors of
mental health.
Hierarchical Regressions –
Environmentalism
Respondents’ environmental behavior was significantly explained
by all three value instruments (PVQ-RR: adjusted R2 = 0.23,
p < 0.001; BVS: adjusted R2 = 0.08, p < 0.001; SVO: adjusted
R2 = 0.02, p = 0.011). Entering the PVQ-RR in the second
step increased the amount of explained variance by 16% when
entering it on top of the BVS (adjusted R2 = 0.24, p < 0.001) as
well as 22% on top of the SVO (adjusted R2 = 0.24, p< 0.001). The
BVS explained 8% of additional variance when entered after the
SVO (adjusted R2 = 0.10, p = 0.003) but no significant amount
after the PVQ-RR (adjusted R2 = 0.24, p = 0.16). However,
entering the SVO after the PVQ-RR led to a marginally significant
increase in explained variance of almost 1% (adjusted R2 = 0.24,
p = 0.088). Entering the SVO on top of the BVS significantly
increased the amount of explained variance by 2% (adjusted
R2 = 0.10, p = 0.008), showing that the two instruments explained
largely independent variance in environmental behavior.
When entered last, the PVQ-RR explained variance on top
of both other predictors (adjusted R2 = 0.25, p < 0.001).
Interestingly, the increase caused by including the SVO last
was marginally significant (adjusted R2 = 0.25, p = 0.088), but
not for the BVS (adjusted R2 = 0.25, p = 0.15). Although pro-
environmental behavior is best explained by the values of the
Schwartz model, respondents’ SVO explains marginally variance
beyond the 19 value types.
Hierarchical Regressions – Selective
Inclusion
To probe the robustness of our findings, we conducted an
additional series of hierarchical regressions. Only predictors
that showed significant zero-order correlations with the
outcome were included. Using this method, there was a
minor change when prosocial behavior was the outcome. The
BVS (suprapersonal values only) now explained significant
variance above PVQ-RR (adjusted R2 = 0.11, p = 0.023).
When environmental behavior was the outcome, the SVO now
significantly explained variance above and beyond the PVQ-RR
(adjusted R2 = 0.26, p = 0.027), the BVS (adjusted R2 = 0.09,
p = 0.002) and both the PVQ-RR and the BVS (adjusted R2 = 0.27,
p = 0.028). The BVS also marginally explained variance on top of
the PVQ-RR (adjusted R2 = 0.26, p = 0.052), the SVO (adjusted
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 September 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1643
fpsyg-09-01643 September 21, 2018 Time: 14:46 # 9
Hanel et al. An Empirical Comparison of Human Value Models
R2 = 0.09, p < 0.001) and both other instruments (adjusted
R2 = 0.27, p = 0.028). While the PVQ still explains the largest
amount of variance by its self (adjusted R2: PVQ-RR = 0.25;
BVS = 0.07; SVO = 0.02), now all instruments explained variance
above the other two measures. We found no significant changes
to the results regarding prosocial behavior and mental health (see
Supplementary Materials for detailed results).
Multidimensional Scaling
Recall that there is controversy over the degree of overlap between
the values assessed by the BVS and PVQ-RR (Gouveia et al.,
2014b). To ascertain where the BVS values lie in the circumplex
structure of the Schwartz model (Schwartz, 1992), we conducted
MDS on responses to the value types in both value scales
(i.e., 6 + 19 values). An MDS results in a graphical solution
called a common space plot, which is based on the correlations
between different inputs. Items with higher correlations are
usually closer in space. In our case, it shows all the values and
their relations based on their correlations. Values with a strong
positive correlation are displayed closer together, while negatively
correlated values are displayed further apart.
Because this analysis included the BVS values with the PVQ-
RR values, it is not surprising that the high Stress-1 parameter of
0.246 indicated a relatively poor fit. Nonetheless, the graphical
output (Figure 2) generally replicated the structure of the
Schwartz Model. We tested this structure by creating the borders
between values described by Schwartz, while allowing the borders
to kink once (Bilsky and Janik, 2010; Bilsky et al., 2011). Note that,
as far as the Schwartz values are concerned, small deviations in
neighboring locations (such as humility included in benevolence
or hedonism included in stimulation) do not constitute a major
problem. However, it is noteworthy that conformity and tradition
values do not form two independent regions in the same
quadrant. The conformity values can instead be found in both
the security and the benevolence region.
Excitement and suprapersonal were placed in the stimulation
value region, while interactive values were placed closer
to benevolence values. Simultaneously, both existence, and
promotion values fall into the regions of self-enhancement values
(achievement and power, respectively), while normative values
are related to the neighboring tradition values. Gouveia et al.
(2014b) classify these values as survival values, representing the
expression of lower-level needs (Maslow, 1943). The similarity
in their motivational structure makes it plausible for these
values to share a common region, as Schwartz (1992) suggests.
Common space plots for the 19 PVQ-RR and the 6 BVS
value types can be found in the Supplementary Materials (see
footnote 1).
DISCUSSION
We set out to compare the ability of seven value measures to
predict behavior in three important research domains: prosocial
behavior, health, and the environment. However, because of
low reliability issues for four of the measures, we included
only three value measures (the PVQ-RR, the SVO, and the
BVS) in our final analysis. Consistent with previous research
using questionnaires based on the Schwartz Model (Bond
and Chi, 1997; Krystallis et al., 2008; Bobowik et al., 2011),
the PVQ-RR explained significant proportions of variance
in prosocial behavior, mental health, and pro-environmental
behavior. Respondents’ BVS values only predicted their prosocial
behavior and pro-environmental behavior, while their SVO
only predicted pro-environmental behavior. The hierarchical
regressions showed that the PVQ-RR explained additional
variance when the BVS or SVO were entered first, but these
measures mostly failed to account for additional variance beyond
the PVQ-RR. Overall, the PVQ-RR values not only showed the
largest zero-order correlations with all three outcome variables,
but they also explained the largest amount of variance in all three
outcomes.
The previous discussions of conceptual overlap between the
values assessed in the BVS and the PVQ-RR (Gouveia et al.,
2014b; Schwartz, 2014) led us to also subject the values of
the PVQ-RR and the BVS to a MDS analysis. The results
replicated the Schwartz model well, with a few minor exceptions.
Some BVS values clustered with PVQ-RR values possessing
similar content (promotion values with power values, normative
values with security values, excitement values with stimulation
values), whereas other BVS values were somewhat out of
place (suprapersonal values with stimulation values). Despite
broadly fitting into Schwartz’s model, the BVS values retained
the structure hypothesized by Gouveia et al. (2014a), with the
values keeping their positions as expressions of thriving or
survival needs. Furthermore, the BVS values were mostly in the
hypothesized order according to the goals they represent: values
representing personal goals were positioned at opposite ends
from values representing social goals, with values representing
central goals between them. The only exception from this
rule were existence and promotion values, which appeared in
reversed order. Thus, we conclude from these findings that
the two value measures tap overlapping motivational space,
but cluster the values in segments with different meanings. To
ensure that the slight deviations from both hypothesized value
structures are not due to them sharing a common space, we
also subjected Schwartz’s and Gouveia’s values to two separate
MDS analyses (see Supplementary Figures S1, S2; see footnote
1). The PVQ-RR value model did not change significantly. In
Schwartz’s value model, benevolence and universalism values
(except for universalism–nature) formed a single dimension. The
Stress-1 value was still high at 0.23. Looking at the Gouveia’s
values, changes included the values being more distanced from
one another and the Stress-1 value being lower (but still
unacceptably high) at 0.17. The division of the values according
to their underlying need is also less clear, since suprapersonal
values are clustered in with values representing survival needs,
while normative values are grouped with values representing
thriving needs. We further tested whether the values would
fit better in a three- or four-dimensional space than a two-
dimensional space. As shown in Figure 3, a third dimension
might represent various differences in measurement between the
BVS and PVQ-RR. The lowest scores on this third dimension
are all occupied by BVS Values (Existence, Excitement and
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FIGURE 2 | Multidimensional Scaling involving 19 PVQ-RR (marked by hollow circles) and 6 BVS values (marked by filled diamonds). Openness vs. conservation is
represented as Dimension 1 (variables in the lower part of Dimension 1 indicate higher openness). Self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence is represented as
Dimension 2 (variables in the lower part of Dimension 2 indicate higher self-enhancement).
Interactive Values), while the highest scores belong to PVQ-RR
Values (Universalism–Nature, Tradition and Security–Societal).
The fit of the three-dimensional solution reduced the Stress-
1 value from 0.25 to 0.16, and a four-dimensional solution
reduced Stress-1 further to 0.11. However, at this point, the
only distinguishable features retained in the 2-dimensional
common space plot, were the four larger value domains of self-
enhancement, self-transcendence, openness and conservation
(Supplementary Figures S3, S4).
Aside from these general findings, which were the focus of
our data collection, there were interesting patterns for each
of the three behavioral domains. For prosocial behavior, the
importance of prosocial goals (i.e., the self-transcendence values
of the PVQ-RR and the suprapersonal values of the BVS) was
the best predictor. Contrary to our expectations, however, a
prosocial value orientation was not related to more frequent
prosocial behavior. This finding contradicts the assumption that
the construct measured by the SVO is actually a preference for
prosocial behavior, rather than merely equal outcomes. After all,
there is no option in the SVO allowing the participant to assign
the other person more points than themselves. The power in
our sample was sufficient to detect medium sized effects, and
therefore we suggest that either the associations are small or
that this result is attributable to the nature of prosocial behavior
and how it was assessed here. Furthermore, prosocial behavior
can have multiple goals (the same goes for pro-environmental
behavior; Joireman et al., 2004). Besides prosocial goals, helpful
behavior increases social status and reputation (Hardy and Van
Vugt, 2006), which makes it valuable for people who pursue
social dominance and achievement. An indication that this
was indeed the case in our sample comes from the positive
correlation between prosocial behavior and power–dominance,
and the lack of a correlation with power–resources. The self-
report measure of “altruistic” behavior may tap domains of
prosociality wherein this motive mixing is likely (example items
in the scale we used might be: “I have helped a stranger to push
a car” or “I have helped an acquaintance move households,”
both were highly correlated with Power–Dominance, r = 0.25
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FIGURE 3 | 3D scatterplot depicting the results of MDS allowing for three dimensions. Dimension 1 represents Self-Enhancement (high-scores) vs.
Self-Transcendence (low-scores). Dimension 2 represents Conservation (high-Scores) vs. Openness (low-scores). Dimension 3 likely represents the question formats
of the different instruments, the PVQ-RR (high-scores) vs. the BVS (low-scores).
and r = 0.21, respectively. Simultaneously, these items showed a
weaker association with Universalism–Nature, at most: r = 0.15
and r = 0.12).
The only significant predictor of mental health was the
PVQ-RR. Coincidentally, past research shows the relationship
between values and well-being to be complex (Bobowik et al.,
2011, for an overview Boer, 2017). One of two prominent
theories in the field, an account based on self-determination
theory (Ryan and Deci, 2000), postulates that there are healthy
values, such as self-transcendence and openness values, which
are directly supportive of well-being. Our results find limited
support for this position. Both PVQ-RR universalism and BVS
suprapersonal values are at best marginally correlated with
mental health. The only values significantly related to well-
being were interpersonal conformity and saving face, but both
are conservation values. A possible explanation comes from the
second prominent theory regarding values and well-being: the
person–environment congruence position (Sagiv and Schwartz,
2000). This view states that pursuing the values that are socially
accepted in the person’s environment leads to increased well-
being. Theoretically, conformity and saving face relates to these
needs more directly. An alternative interpretation might be that
people who value face are unlikely to admit to prevailing mental
health issues. In this case, our findings would not represent an
actual connection between valuing face and mental health, but
rather showcase the tendency of individuals who value face to
hide or deny undesirable aspects of themselves.
Interestingly, all three value measures significantly explained
variance in pro-environmental behavior, although the PVQ-
RR nature value showed the highest correlation with pro-
environmental behavior. All universalism values from the PVQ-
RR were reliably correlated with pro-environmental behavior; as
were both self-direction values. As with prosocial behavior, the
suprapersonal value dimension of the BVS significantly predicted
pro-environmental behavior. Hierarchical regressions showed
that the BVS did not explain variance on top of the PVQ-RR,
indicating that the motivation tapped by suprapersonal values
can be found in the values of the Schwartz model. The SVO
explained pro-environmental behavior because respondents who
made more prosocial choices were more likely to report more
frequent pro-environmental behavior, whereas respondents who
made more pro-self (especially competitive) choices were less
likely to report pro-environmental behavior.
Our results show the PVQ-RR values are the best predictors
of all three outcome measures. One explanation for this might
be that the PVQ-RR items overlaps semantically more with the
outcome measures than the BVS items. Specifically, recall that
the PVQ-RR asks respondents to rate how similar they perceive
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themselves to be to a person, while all they know about that
person is that a certain behavior is important to the individual
(e.g., “It is important for her/him to care for nature”). Although
there are some items that describe people who merely strive to be
something (e.g., “It is important to her/him to be wealthy”), the
more behavior-focused nature of the comparisons in the PVQ-RR
might also contribute to stronger relations with behavior. Indeed,
research by Arnulf et al. (2014) demonstrated how predictor–
outcome similarity in meaning can influence the relationship
between two measures.
A limitation of this study is that we used the cultural-level
inventory VSM instead of the individual level CVSCALE to
measure Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (Yoo et al., 2011). The
latter scale is designed to tap the same values as the VSM, but on
an individual level. This choice may at least partly explain the low
reliabilities of the VSM in our sample.
As discussed above, it should also be noted that while the
PVQ-RR and the BVS measure value importance, this is less
clear with the SVO. The measure was described to portray
“stable preferences of outcomes for oneself and others” (Van
Lange et al., 1997, p. 773; for similar definition, see for example,
McClintock and Liebrand, 1988). However, it is worth noting
that choices in the task could also reflect social norms or
habits.
In summary, our results demonstrate that the PVQ-RR is the
best predictor of all three types of behavior. While the BVS and
the SVO significantly explained variance in some of the outcome
variables, the PVQ-RR explained variance above and beyond both
in almost every case. These findings provide empirical support
for the growing use of Schwartz’s scale as a predictor of value-
relevant attitudes and behavior.
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